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This study is a review of the political and economic
issues that are involved in East-West trade and technology
transfer in the 1980' s. Using unclassified sources,
specific instances of technology transfer are evaluated and
assessments as to its impact are made. The analysis
provides evidence that the Soviet Union and their allies
derive relative advantage from East-West trade—one which
not only provides greater net economic benefits to the East,
but also is creating serious security concerns in the West.
The main conclusion of the research undertaken is that
the nature and severity of the problem have been greatly
underestimated by both scholars and government officials.
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INTRODUCTION
V.I. Lenin: "Comrades, don't panic, when things go very
hard for us, we will give a rope to the
bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie will hang
itself."
Karl Radek: "But Vladimir Il'ich, where will we get enough
rope to hand the whole bourgeoisie?"
V.I. Lenin: "They'll sell it to us!"
Lenin's quip that Western businessmen would sell him the
rope he needed to hang them has become a cliche that
exaggerates—but not by much—capitalist greed. The West
has for years, in fact, sold the Soviet Union much of what
was required to outfit one of the most remarkable and
massive military buildups in history.
If Lenin were alive today, he might conclude with con-
siderable delight that the nature of the capitalist had not
changed notably since his time when they provided his nation
its industrial base.
A . BACKGROUND
Any discussion of East-West trade and technology
transfer must include not only the economic ramifications of
such events but the political implications as well. Realis-
tic and idealistic costs/benefits must be analyzed to deter-
mine the actual net value/detriment towards the U.S.
national interest. There are important questions that must
be answered. What is the importance of East-West trade to
the East and the West? What is the relationship between
trade and detente? Does the Soviet bloc gain more from
trade than the West? What about the growing indebtedness of
the East to the West? What policy options are open to the
West? Is greater interdependence a desirable state of
affairs? What leverage, what chance of influencing Soviet
political and military postures, does their growing depen-
dence on Western technology give us, and in what circum-
stances is it appropriate to use this leverage and
influence?
The continuing objective of U.S. regulation of East-West
trade has been to balance both the commercial benefits of
trade and the objectives of detente against the need to
safeguard U.S. security interests. Continuing controversy
about the proper balance is inevitable: there is no objec-
tive test of whether such a balance has been achieved, the
economic and political circumstances affecting East-West
relationships are in constant flux, and the United States
has no comprehensive East-West trade policy.
The past and present state of U.S. policy towards techn-
nology trade with Communist nations is, in large measure, a
reflection of the ambiguity, uncertainty and dissension
which have typified the U.S. overall posture towards the
Communist bloc. The present policy guidelines are contained
in the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979. The EAA is
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the most recent embodiment of a long line of statutory
pronouncements since the passage of the first Export Control
Act in 1949 whose initial thrust was the establishment of
stringent controls on all exports to Communist nations in
response to the Cold War. The 1949 Act was amended and
extended several times throughout the 1950' s and 1960's, as
controls were slowly relaxed. 1 This study will suggest
alternatives for reforming existing policy as well as point
out the problems and resulting security concerns as a result
of present U.S. trade policy with the East and the flow of
technology from the West to the East.
For purposes of this study, "East" will represent only
the Soviet Union and its European allies (U.S. trade
policies towards China and Cuba, for example, have a very
different history and would raise very different issues)
.
The "West" will be represented by the industrialized
"capitalist" world, and includes the U.S., Canada, our
European allies and Japan.
B. HYPOTHESIS
This study will examine both the economic and political
implications of the trade and technology exchange that
exists between the East and West. The hypothesis examined
below is that the manner in which these exchanges are
-'Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre, National
Security and Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions
of East-West Trade , Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983,
P. 119.
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carried out benefit the East more than the West. A sub-
hypothesis is that the West would, however, be worse off if
this mutual exchange were to be completely terminated.
C. METHODOLOGY
An examination of the hypothesis stated above will
involve a critical review of the literature and examination
of several different positions that have been taken by
scholars, government officials and business people regarding
the benefits and drawbacks to East-West trade and technology
transfer.
The obvious results of trade and technology transfer,
that is the economic considerations, will be discussed
first, followed by the more elusive and clouded political
implications of trade between two drastically different
social systems. The discussions in this study are not
intended to be a new approach to this subject—a new
approach would obviously be a wrong appraisal— instead a new




U.S. trade with the Soviet Union has always been an
issue of great controversy, and is likely to remain a sensi-
tive issue for the foreseeable future. As long as the
Soviets remain our principal adversary, economic relations
with their country will continue to be used as an instrument
of national policy. The existence of this superpower
rivalry does not however mean that East-West trade cannot
exist— it does exist— for better or worse. The premise of
this study, and more directly, this chapter, is that by
redefining our goals and examining the major economic issues
in trade with the Soviet bloc, the distribution of economic
benefits can be made more equitable by improving our
policies concerning East-West trade.
B. SANCTIONS
On January 4, 1980, less than two weeks after the
initial Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Carter
imposed a series of sanctions designed to "make the Soviets
pay a price for aggression." The sanctions included:
1) a ban on the licensing of high technology;
2) a partial embargo of U.S. grain exports;
3) curtailment of Soviet fishing rights within U.S.
territorial waters;
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4) a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games;
5) deferral of many U.S. -Soviet cultural and scientific
exchanges;
6) delay in opening consular offices in Kiev and New
York ;
7) a request for Senate deferral of SALT II; and
8) a pledge to provide arms and aid to Pakistan.
As the President explained in a briefing to Members of
Congress, the Administration had three options: military,
political, and economic. The military option was ruled out
because it was deemed "inappropriate" and "infeasible.
"
Political sanctions, such as a resolution in the U.N.
General Assembly condemning the intervention, were consider-
ed too mild. The U.S. opted for trade sanctions "to punish"
the Soviet Union and to impress on the Soviet leadership the
seriousness with which the U.S. viewed the invasion.
Then, facing a seriously deteriorating domestic situa-
tion, the Jaruzelski regime in Poland declared martial law
on December 13, 1981. The U.S. responded ten days later by:
1) suspending Polish civil aviation privileges in the
U.S.;
2) halting progress on renewing the Export-Import Bank's
line of credit insurance to the Polish Government;
3) suspending the right of the Polish fishing fleet to
operate in American waters; and
4) proposing to Western allies further restrictions on
high technology exports to Poland.
By far the most damaging of these actions was the deci-
sion to cancel a $25 million line of credit insurance for
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short term loans to Poland that would have enabled Polish
suppliers and banks to pay for imports from the United
States. Without the Export-Import credits private lending
to Poland stopped altogether.
When looking at the broadening web of East-West economic
relations, it is generally accepted in this country as a
positive development in world affairs as well as in our
national interest. Trade is a normal aspect of internation-
al life. While we should not expect trade to reduce, much
less eliminate, the wide political divergences between East
and West, it is a valuable link between the two differing
political and economic systems.
The concern in trade lies in the stated hypothesis that
at the present time, the East has more to gain from trade
and other economic relations than the West. This is best
shown in simple terms—the East does not have as much as the
West to offer in terms of markets of international trade as
evidenced by the East's lopsided debt to the West. This
should not be misinterpreted however. The West does benefit
from trade with the East in terms of insuring fuller produc-
tion, income from foreign sales, and benefits from reinvest-
ment of capital, among other things. It is important to
remember, though, that until the East has a product,
resource, or service to offer the West, we will not realize
the full benefit of this economic exchange. Soviet natural
gas to Europe may be a resource to partially correct this
15
imbalance. On the other hand, however, the outlawing of
Solidarity in Poland prompted still another economic penalty
in the form of American efforts to block or delay the
Siberian gas pipeline. The Reagan Administration's argu-
ments against the project shifted from concerns of European
energy dependence to moral injunctions against carrying on
"business as usual" with a regime guilty of the heinous sup-
pression of the rights of Polish workers. The Europeans'
failure to cancel the project was interpreted in the U.S. as
tacit consent of the Soviet policies in Poland and further
divided the Western alliance.
C. EXPANSION INTO EASTERN MARKETS
During the past twenty-five years economic relations
between the Western market economies and the Eastern
European states have developed along with, but to a lesser
degree than, East-West political relations. A trend towards
a greater East-West economic interdependence is apparent as
political and economic circumstances have caused or made
possible a sharp increase in trade between the two groups of
countries.
Some of the recent economic developments seen involving
East-West trade are decidedly more distinctive and complex
than those of the past. Exports to Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union in the 1970s have been financed by public and
private credits to a much greater extent than in earlier
periods. The resulting debt to Western governments and
16
banks is large in the absolute— in excess of $60 billion
—
and in relation to the East's earnings of hard currencies.
In addition, most of the Eastern European countries,
including the Soviet Union, have entered into "industrial
cooperation" agreements with private Western firms. These
agreements, which are a limited form of direct foreign
investment, reflect a continuing effort to devise ways to
overcome the difficulties of conducting relations between
market-oriented economies and centrally planned economic
systems.
Western businessmen, however, often complain about the
problems of trading with the East. The planned character of
trade, the limited relevance of the pricing system to the
market, the lack of currency convertability, the secrecy
surrounding economic information, and the prevalence of
barter or countertrade, all contribute to make business
perhaps more awkward than elsewhere. Nevertheless, over the
years the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
market has proved attractive to Western companies, offering
them large-scale contracts, usually observed scrupulously by
COMECON governments and affording a valuable outlet for such
things as turnkey plants and food which would be hard to
sell in the West. Few of these complaints are of strategic
importance to Western governments, which ought to be able to
rely on the wits of their businessmen to ensure that trade
is not of unilateral advantage to the East (but, as will be
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discussed later in this paper, it is amazing that some
businessmen would sell their mothers short not to mention
their governments and national interests)
.
One factor is worth noting in the conduct of East-West
trade. This is the negotiating advantage which COMECON
governments draw from their monopoly hold on foreign trade,
both in buying and selling. Most COMECON foreign trade
organizations, though in some countries their structure is
changing, can still play Western companies off against each
other. Their bargaining position is increased by the fact
that they are responsible for applying the (theoretically at
least) non-negotiable decisions of the Central Plan and have
the full force of the government behind them. These advan-
tages can produce very good bargaining results for COMECON
countries. One graphic example is the Siberian pipeline
contracts. The Soviet Union, by using the same negotiating
team throughout, was able to play different Western coun-
tries off against each other and then play different com-
panies from the same country off against each other. As the
lowest bid for any part of a contract was automatically
relayed to Western competitors, they successively underbid
each other. According to Soviet sources, Western negotia-
tors have in the years of negotiations been forced to cut
their price originally quoted by up to 60 percent. 2
2Axel Lebahn, "The Yamal Gas Pipeline from the USSR to
Western Europe in the East-West Conflict," Aussenpolitik
,
Vol. 34, No. 3, Autumn 1983.
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It is not practicable or appropriate to set up national
or international cartels in the West for the purpose of
negotiating terms with the East, but the fact that the
Soviet Union and other centrally planned Eastern economies
can, because of the manner in which their economies are
structured, drive a hard bargain on price, has a wider rele-
vance when other factors like credit are weighed in the
balance. If one assumes that the West does not intend to
confer one-sided economic benefit on its major political and
military adversary, the Soviet bloc, then something may well
have gone wrong if, say, the Soviet Union can time after
time negotiate the lowest price on a Western good and then
import it on Western-subsidized credit!
Most Western governments have a policy of differentiat-
ing in favor of those East European systems of which they
approve and, by implication, against those of which they
disapprove. Eastern Europe has not been a uniform part of
the Soviet bloc since the days of Josef Stalin, and any
attempt by the West to pretend that it is has the obvious
effect of driving Eastern Europe and the USSR together.
Crude attempts by the West at differentiation have the same
unwelcome effect. An example of this was Vice President
George Bush's speech in September 1983, after visits to
Hungary and Romania. He singled out those two countries for
favorable distinction from both the rest of Eastern Europe
19
and the Soviet Union, which he openly criticized. This had
the counter-productive result of embarrassing Hungary in
particular.
Subtler means of differentiation exist. They are
chiefly economic, not only because they have a lower
political profile, but also because economic aid is
important for countries embarking on economic reform.
This differentiation is bound to be a very fine dividing
line between those countries for which a favorable distinc-
tion exists and those with a not-so-favorable status. The
USSR having such a prominent position in the COMECON, is
almost certain to get any technology that these favored
Eastern countries might receive from the West due to the web
of multiple socio-political factors and military ties.
Nevertheless, exceptions have been made and Eastern Europe
has received hi-tech items from the West, such as navigation
equipment for a newly designed jet fighter/trainer built
jointly with Yugoslavia and Romania known as the IAR-93 or
Orao. 3 It should be recognized in the West that even if a
favored bloc country wanted to, keeping technology passed to
them from the West with a stipulation of not passing it on
would be politically impossible. Where warranted,
3 David Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," Adelphi Papers, No. 192, The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1984,
Heffers Printers Ltd., Cambridge, p. 48.
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case-by-case exceptions for equipment of a less than overtly
military nature could be made by the West.
D. TRADE GUIDELINES
An attempt by the West to develop a detailed and uniform
economic policy for economic relations with the East would
be a futile exercise that would have more exceptions to the
rule than rules themselves. There are, however, some guide-
lines worth noting in dealing with the East; guidelines
which will help sort out the economic goals while maintain-
ing sights on our national interests. A single guideline
could never be all encompassing to deal with all the circum-
stances and conflicting pressures facing Western govern-
ments. However, a collection of well researched and
developed guidelines should provide a preferred economic and
political course of action along with several possible
alternatives to most any economic situation that might
arise. Some possible broad guidelines that should be
included in the West's repertoire might include: 4
- The West should ensure that its trading with the East
does not enhance Soviet military power and does not
erode what technological lead the West has over the
Soviet Union in weapons.
- The West should recognize that economic leverage cannot,
of itself, curb Soviet military power, and that economic
sanctions have little direct political influence over
the Soviet bloc.
4 Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 50.
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- Distortions in East-West trade which benefit the USSR
should be avoided, as should any undue trade or commodi-
ty dependence on the Soviet Union. At the same time the
West should do what it can to differentiate its economic
policies in favor of reformist East European regimes.
Many Western policy-makers can agree on these guidelines
in theory for these precepts are far easier to preach than
to practice. The basic problem with these guidelines as
with any set of ideas is 'consensus.' Rarely can any idea
gain simultaneous support of governments, voters, and
commercial lobbies in the West. It is this conflict of
interest that divides not only the allies but groups and
organizations within the individual Western countries that
make such policy decisions difficult if not impossible in a
democratic environment.
Western foreign and defense ministers realize the need
to stem the flow of technology that the East has exploited
and used in its military missions. The West generally
accepts the Reagan Administration's definition of the tech-
nology problem, even though they quarrel with aspects of the
proposed U.S. solution—the old "I suppose you are right
but, let somebody else suffer the hardships of the plan"
routine. Any plan that is designed to halt the technology
leak to the East will almost certainly also hurt trade to
the East which in turn will reduce money coming from the
East—not a popular platform to take with voters who
suffered a more severe recession in Europe and in fact are
still feeling its effect long after the U.S. has recovered
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for the most part. Put another way, Western taxpayers do
not sense that the 'technology drain 1 is indirectly hurting
their pockets and raising their taxes. What has real
impact, however, is the prospect that trade in widely avail-
able commercial technology is going to be obstructed by
security controls, the possibility that the U.S., in over-
enthusiastic pursuit of controls against the Soviet bloc,
will slam the 'technology tap' door to her own allies, and
the fear that the West's free flow of scientific information
will dry up in a more secure technology transfer climate
—
i.e., the Reagan Administration's attempted embargo on pipe-
line technology and the tightening of controls on export of
computer hardware and software.
The concept of general economic denial or embargo
towards the Soviet Union and its allies is considered in the
West by most people as inappropriate, even in such a time of
increased political-military tension as the mid-1980 's.
They suggest that an answer lies somewhere short of this
concept and includes a blend of technology transfer control
or censorship. A freer international market up to the point
of denying the East military technology is certain to pay
higher dividends than harsh sanctions that in the end will
have little impact anyway. To support this thesis, recent
history of East-West relations reveals few instances where
economic pressure was successfully applied for political
ends. A sanction is by definition a stick and not a carrot
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ends. A sanction is by definition a stick and not a carrot
—the West would likely meet with little success in
presenting the USSR, as a superpower, with an economic
sanction to influence its military or political behavior;
e.g., U.S. sanctions imposed after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, or when the West imposed sanctions after
martial law was established in Poland.
E. CONCLUSION
The West over the next decade will have an opportunity
to rewrite the manual on East-West trade relations to which
there will be a more mutual benefit as well as greater
control of the shortcomings now being faced. The USSR has
already seen four leaders in this decade, and with four of
her six East European allies being led by men in their 70' s,
there is a certain period of leadership change approaching.
With the inevitable passing of this old guard, which has
already begun with Gorbachev's arrival, new men will have
new opportunities to change policy in the East. The West
would be in a better position to influence the choices of
these new leaders, if it had laid out its economic strategy
in advance. The 'passive' aspect of this should be the
imposition of appropriate technology controls, reduction in
export credit subsidy and the avoidance of undue dependence
on the Soviet Union for energy
—
just as the Soviet Union is
seeking to reduce its dependence on Western grain. The
'active' part of the Western strategy should include
24
goods, partly by giving the East better (but controlled)
access to Western markets, and a welcome for those Eastern
Europe countries which want to join the Western world's
economic institutions.
A strategy such as this would give the new guard of
Soviet bloc leaders a clearer set of signals than they have
had from the West in the recent past, and would also stand a
good chance of winning domestic support from all sectors




It has often been said that the Soviets have more to
gain from East-West trade than the United States, and in
many instances their gain is at our expense. In an effort
to further examine this popular notion among political
economists that paint this dreary picture of East vs. West
in the international trade game, let us examine some ideas
of both theory and fact. First, it must be accepted that
the East, the Soviets and their allies, do gain from East-
West trade; this is a given anytime trade deals are
voluntarily entered into, barring major errors and
miscalculations. But theory and practice show us that, of
the two parties to a deal, one may gain more than the other,
and that skill and strategy in the process of bargaining can
make a difference.
B. PRO-TRADE VS. ANTI-TRADE ARGUMENTS
To insure that the East does not take unfair advantage
and more importantly take something for nothing from the
West, we must examine the designs of export controls in the
context of current East-West trade relations. The central
issue of export control policy concerns the trade-off
between economic benefits and the political and/or national
security risks. To make that trade-off in a manner that
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makes both economic and political sense, several questions
must be answered:
1. How do our exports affect the enemy's military
capabilities?
2. How do our exports (and their effects on the enemy)
affect us?
3. What can export controls do about those effects? And
what other effects do export controls have, or could
they have?
To answer the first two questions we should weigh the
pro-trade arguments against the anti-trade arguments. The
pro-trade view sees trade benefitting us in many ways.
First, by promoting communication through new economic
channels should, in turn, increase political communication,
mutual esteem, and allow a more effective understanding of
the enemy's system. Also, providing mutually beneficial
interaction in economic arenas may improve relations in the
more conflictive domains of politics and security. Through
economic interaction we may be able to foster the enemy's
convergence towards our own economic and political
practices.
The anti-trade version denies these benefits and even
turns the tables to reflect a very different outlook on
East-West trade. Trade allows the enemy to penetrate our
system and invites us to entertain alien economic practices
(while cooperating and to facilitate dealing with a social-
ist economic system—this can lead to a dependence on a
product, such as a European dependence on Soviet oil, that
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could subjugate a Western economy to Socialist economic
practices) —both presumably undesirable. The alleged
mutually beneficial economic interaction actually restricts
national sovereignty. The ability of microcontracts to
prevent macroconflicts is historically discontinued. 5
Thus, trade with the East can be analyzed from many
different angles and each approach can propose an argument
that is either pro or anti-trade with convincing verbiage.
Economic interests and needs clearly interact with geostra-
tegic and military interests which in turn plays a major
role in our national security. National security being a
part of the national interest invites a careful review of
any trade with the enemy that might in some way aid his
military development or in some way compromise ours. The
connection between economics and national security runs both
ways. Economic strength is a necessary ingredient to
provide the infrastructure and industrial complex to support
a military power over a period of time. Military strength
on the other hand can be used in a political strategy to
realize some economic advantages. Arguments can be made
that either military expenditures seriously detract from
economic growth or military expenditures act as a catalyst
and contribute favorably to economic growth. In any case,
any technology or product traded to the East will at best
5Before WWI, France and Germany were each other's chief
trading partners; the United States was Japan's before Pearl
Harbor!
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reduce the expenditure required on R&D to develop the same
technology without Western assistance or in the worst case
provide the technology required to begin production and thus
provide economic advantages that would not otherwise be
available to their military-industrial complex. And, in an
even worse case, the chance of the enemy improving on our
technology and as a result gaining an advantage that might
otherwise have cost him dearly in R&D dollars as well as
time and national resources. This might someday be the dif-
ference between victory and defeat in military conflict.
Gaining this so-called technological advantage or break-
through is a real and continually possible development that
worries the governments of the West. As Henry Kissinger
warned all the way back in 1957 of "technological surprise,"
when the West enjoyed a decisive advantage, he said
there has been a great deal of discussion about the
possible consequences of technological breakthroughs which
may be achieved by either side, and, given the current
rate of technological change, this factor presents a real
problem ... an adverse technological breakthrough is
always possible. 6
Analysts, government officials, and academics all agree that
such a strategic breakthrough in weaponry could negate the
strongest defense posture. In 1973, President Nixon, his
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Defense, Research
and Engineering all stressed the importance and unsolved
nature of technological breakthroughs (especially by the
6Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy ,
Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957, pp. 118, 128.
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other side) . Technological surprise is seen as the worst of
the worst cases, with visions of unknown analogues to the
atomic monopoly, this time under enemy ownership. 7 What
better argument for export controls on certain technology?
Several export control officers of this era are reported to
have said in interviews that the fear of a Soviet techno-
logical breakthrough was the major reason for the continued
existence of trade controls—even at the height of detente.
The purpose of these export controls was to delay the
communist acquisition of military technology. The goal, as
stated in several government documents, 8 was not pretending
that these controls would deny the East that technology
forever, as it was understood that this was
.
impossible; nor
was it to increase the monetary cost of technological capa-
bility, since other East-West trade had already greatly
expanded in all directions and enabled the communist coun-
tries to save large amounts of money. The notion is that
7 See: Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970 *s; Shapinq a Durable Peace , A Report to Congress, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973; Elliot
L. Richardson, Statement of the Secretary of Defense Elliot
L. Richardson before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
the 1974 Defense Budget, p. 14, U.S. Senate, 93d Congress,
1st Session, 1973; John S. Foster, Jr., The Department of
Defense Program of Research Development, Test and Education,
FY 1974: Statement by the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering
, p. 27, Defense Subcommittee of the Appropria-
tions Committee, U.S. Senate, 93d Congress, 1st Session,
March 28, 1973.
8See Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970 's; Shaping A Durable Peace , a report to Congress, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973.
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certain goods, if exported freely, would provide the
communists with technologies unobtainable by them at any
price over some relevant time horizon, and this delay in
communist procurement makes the U.S. deterrent more credi-
ble, insures the superiority of U.S. military forces, and
reduces the possibility of technological surprise. 9
C. EXPORT CONTROLS
Export officials, when dealing with export controls
designed to keep Western technology from the East, differ-
entiate between two types of technology. First, what they
refer to as "technology of the laboratory" tends toward pure
science, in which the Soviets are considered our equal in
most areas and superior in a few. Controls on the flow of
this kind of technology are difficult to construct, since
they occur in scientific journals and other publications,
academic interchanges, professional conferences, and so
forth. The other form of technology known as the "tech-
nology of the factory" is comprised of practical know-how,
machinery, and processes that transform laboratory tech-
niques into industrial production. In this form of tech-
nology the Soviets lag well behind the West and it is
believed that controls on exports, commercial technology
transfers, and turnkey plants are effective and feasible
9Robert E. Klitgaard, National Security and Export
Controls , Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, April
1974, p. 17.
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measures to impede Soviet technological development. Export
controls are then seen as preserving the West's technologi-
cal advantage at the factory and not aimed at stopping
Soviet scientific advances in the laboratory.
To answer the question of what effects export controls
will have and how they affect our national interests must be
looked at from both the West's and the East's point of view.
Consider the example of guns and wheat being considered for
export from the West to the East. We might first suppose
that guns being of military value to the East should be
restricted and that wheat contributing to their civilian
nourishment could be safely exported to them. It is a well-
known fact that the East produces weapons, including guns,
quite efficiently, while growing wheat very inefficiently
when compared to U.S. farmers. The wheat sales to the USSR
would then save them money by buying wheat from the U.S.
more cheaply than they could produce it themselves and as a
result freeing more resources for eventual military use.
Wheat shipments may permit the Soviets to keep chemical
industries oriented towards munitions rather than fertiliz-
ers. It is therefore clear that in order to restrict all
possible military gains by the East, we should export
nothing to them and try to persuade our allies to do the
same. This of course is not at all realistic and would be
virtually impossible to orchestrate. And this is only one
angle which we need to consider in this example. So what is
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the correct combination of technology transfer and East-West
trade? It is a delicate balance that must be adjusted and
readjusted constantly. The U.S. has taken a firm position
with regard to export controls—export controls are a
national security matter and not subject to negotiations. 10
Even in the export of non-military items there is concern of
breaches in our national security and thus a threat to our
national interest. In 1964, then Secretary of Agriculture
Orville Freeman, argued against agricultural exports to the
USSR. He stated that
making our peaceful technology available (to the Soviets)
would have the effect of releasing their scientists,
engineers, and technicians for work on other and perhaps
less peaceful projects. It would materially shorten the
time needed for research and development, and could sub-
stantially increase their economic potential. It could
hasten the time when the communists could more effectively
infiltrate and influence the developing and uncommitted
countries through aid programs. It could enhance their
ability to provide aid to such countries as Cuba without
imposing unacceptable deprivations on their own people in
the Soviet Union.
D. CONCLUSION
Secretary Freeman's statement is shared with many and it
may in fact have some value in maintaining the technology
gap between the East and West, but I do not believe that
this is a major consideration among many government ana-
lysts—the fact of the matter is that the United States and
our allies are more intent in using export controls and
10Richard S. Frank, "Trade Report/U.S. Sees Surplus,
More Jobs in Early Years of Expanded Trade with the Soviet
Union," National Journal , 1972, pp. 1799-1808.
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economic sanctions as a form of economic leverage. This is
like blowing into a hurricane—the East is no more bothered
by these feeble attempts to influence their political
actions than we would be if they threatened to cut off the
flow of caviar and vodka—we would simply get them somewhere
else, just as they do when we erect one of our trade
barriers—usually from one of our allies or even from an
American corporation more interested in dealing in the grey
or black market and making a buck rather than supporting a
government sanction. There will always be specific
instances in which military action is neither feasible nor
advisable, but in which moral outrage is not enough. In
these circumstances economic actions may be appropriate and
—even if only slightly—might act as a stick or carrot.
The sheer size and fundamental health (even in a severe
recession) of the American economy is one of the greatest
strengths of our foreign and security policy. It was not so
long ago that the Arab oil embargo brought this country to a
halt—an event that most agree strengthened us in the long
run. Might not an embargo of technology to the East cause a
similar metamorphosis to occur and thus improve our enemies'
position? The use of the West's economic strength is a
delicate matter and should be thought out thoroughly and
coordinated with our allies and friends. Then, and only
then, can the West hope to find the right combination of
bilateral trade/mutual cooperation and economic restraint
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with the East that will best serve our economic interests as
well as our national interest.
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IV. WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
As already discussed in Chapter III there are serious
concerns surrounding East-West trade and the associated
technology transfer that might aid the East in developing
military-related industries. This chapter will look at
specific technologies that are flowing eastward and also at
the Soviet "war machine" and how it may have benefitted at
the expense of Western technology.
For some period of time, we believed that Soviet weapon
systems and military hardware were indigenous to the East.
Forty or more years ago the Soviets received a generous
helping of strategic technology from their allies, the
United States and other Western nations. After the Second
World War, the American assistance dropped off sharply, but
like the U.S., the Soviets were recipients of the spoils of
war in the form of German expertise gained from captured
scientists and technicians. This infusion of German tech-
nology gave the Soviets the foundations for development of
missile, radar and jet propulsion technologies. It is
generally accepted that throughout the fifties the Soviets
relied almost entirely on their own military-industrial
ingenuity and apart from a few spectacular successes—such
as the 1957 launch of Sputnik—the Communist camp lagged
36
well behind the U.S. and even some of the other Western
industrial nations in military technology.
Throughout the 1970 's, U.S. concerns were growing
regarding a suspected military technology drain from the
West to the East. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard Perle stated in 1983 that the Reagan Admin-
istration was providing hard evidence supporting these
assumptions based on KGB defections describing the inside
workings of the Soviet military industrial complex. 11 The
CIA had been claiming that since the late 1960 's
the Soviets had acquired militarily significant technolo-
gies and critically important industrial Western technolo-
gies that were benefitting every major Soviet industry in
research. development, and production of weapons
systems. 12
This is quite likely the cause, more than any others, of the
narrowing of the Western lead over the East in such key
defense-related areas as microelectronics and computers. 13
The result of all this is viewed by many U.S. officials as
the cold reality that the U.S. and her allies have, for the
past 2 5 years or so, unwittingly been developing weapons for
i:LBuchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 11.
12
"Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology";
Washington, D.C., CIA, 1982.
13U.S. Defense Department, "The Technology Transfer
Control Problem," Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., DOD,
1983.
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both themselves and the Soviet Union, and Western R&D might
as well be considered a Soviet national asset. 14
So, what has the USSR gained? Before we can quantify
the impact, if any, on the overall security balance, we
should first take a look at what the Soviet Union has
gained, both legally and illegally, from the West.
While it is acknowledged that the Soviets depend far
less on Western military technology today when compared to
the immediate post-war period, the CIA claims that "today
Soviet military designers carefully choose the Western
designs, engineering approaches and equipment most
appropriate to their deficiencies and needs." 15 They con-
tend that the Soviets have also acquired military technology
in areas such as microelectronics, and had they not pur-
chased or in many instances "purloined" from the West, they
would not have achieved their present technical level. As
already discussed, this acquisition of Western technology
has allowed the Soviet Union to expend less of her own
resources than she would have otherwise done. An unclassi-
fied version of CIA and Department of Defense analysis 16
will give a clearer demonstration of this discussion and
14 Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 11.
15
"Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology," p. 3.
16Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology , Washington,
D.C., CIA, 1982 and U.S. Defense Department, The Technology
Transfer Control Program , Report to Congress, Washington,
D.C., DOD, 1983.
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quite clearly supports the military application of my
hypothesis.
Let us take a closer look at this so-called Soviet War
Machine. What of its strategic weapon systems—and how
about the Soviet bloc's Air Forces and Navies—are the
Soviet tactical systems in fact "totally Soviet"—and
finally do the Soviets and their allies develop their own
microelectronics and computer systems or do they have access
to everything from Radio Shack on up to sophisticated IBM
military hardware and software that might not even be avail-
able to some of our allies? The unclassified version from
the government is disturbing if not infuriating to think
that our tax system is in reality subsidizing the Union of
the Soviet Socialist Republic's Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Rocket Missile Forces! Imagine how the story reads in the
classified versionl Because of the classification of the
examples that will be presented below, some will be given on
simply conjecture although some are clearly based on hard
evidence.
B. STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
There is a striking similarity noted between the silos
for the U.S. Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) and the SS-13, the first solid-fuel Soviet ICBM. The




Somewhat stronger claims are made for the possible con-
tribution of Western precision micro-ball-bearings in
improving Soviet missile guidance through better gyroscopes
and accelerometers . This chiefly concerns the sale in 1972
to the Soviet Union of 168 precision grinding machines from
the Bryant Grinder Corporation of the U.S. The Soviet
precision-bearing industry had until then lagged well behind
that of the West and without the Western equipment it is
highly unlikely that the Soviet missile guidance capability
would have allowed them to acquire both the quality and
quantity of missiles that they in fact produced during the
1970 's with the assistance of the United States.
Obviously the accuracy of Soviet ICBM's is an extremely
sensitive matter to the U.S. Yet a technology seemingly as
harmless as a ball-bearing has allowed the Communist World
to achieve nuclear parity with us. To regain superiority,
if it is even possible, will require billions of dollars and
the raising of the Arms Race to the next level—all because
of our carelessness with some harmless little round metal
balls. 17
C. AIRCRAFT
The CIA believes that the Soviet Union is keen to get
hold of Western aircraft technology, partly to develop
counter-measures but primarily to imitate and learn from the
17 Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 14.
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technology itself. She obtained plenty of hardware and data
from aircraft shot down, captured or left in Viet Nam, and
continues to try and acquire plans and drawings, particular-
ly of U.S. transport and wide-bodied jets, as well as infor-
mation about manufacturing techniques. She apparently
acquired early draft plans of the Lockheed C-5A military
transport aircraft. At one point a team of Soviet "civil-
ians" visited the Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas and Boeing
plants in the U.S. out of a declared interest in possibly
buying some wide-bodied jets. U.S. officials later claimed
that the "civilian" visitors included a three-star general
in the Soviet development command, and that they wore
special shoes to pick up traces of the special metals used
in U.S. aircraft-building for subsequent analysis. 18
Disturbing similarities can be seen in many Soviet
state-of-the-art aircraft and U.S. aircraft. The Soviet
CONDOR jet transport is suspiciously similar to Lockheed's
C-5A GALAXY— lengths, wingspans and tail heights of the
CONDOR are all within inches of the GALAXY'S. There is a
remarkable similarity between the 11-86 jet transport and
the Boeing 747, the U.S. AWACS and its new Soviet counter-
part, the 11-76 CANDID and the C-141B STARLIFTER, the An-12
CUB and the Lockheed C-130A/H HERCULES, and the Soviet ASW
long-range patrol aircraft the 11-38 MAY and Lockheed's P-3C
18 Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 14.
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ORION are so similar that their parts are almost
interchangeable. The one thing common about all these
aircraft other than the obvious is that the U.S. counterpart
was always designed and produced before the Soviet version.
And if this is just a coincidence, why have we not seen the
Soviets come up with prototypes that never make it into
production like we see in the West? Because the Soviets are
quite content, in my view, to let the Capitalist World spend
all the R&D dollars, develop the technology and conduct the
cost/benefit analysis and only after the system is a proven
success will the Soviets then buy, borrow or steal the
technology for their own use without any of the associated
expenses and headaches. Still on the horizon, the USSR is
building a new bomber which is reportably very similar to
Rockwell's B-1B Bomber and the Soviet space shuttle, which
is nearing its launch date, is amazingly similar to our own
multi-billion dollar space fleet. How much money did the
Soviets save in this case? Billions, I submit.
This can hardly be considered conclusive evidence on its
own, but when combined with intelligence that has not been
presented in this report due to its classified nature, we
can clearly see that the Soviets' tactics in collecting
Western technology in the Aerospace field has not only saved
them billions of dollars, precious resources, and valuable
time, but it has also allowed them to close the technology
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gap using Western technology and in some cases even
improving on it.
D. NAVAL SYSTEMS
The Soviets have sought to gain access to advanced
Western technology in naval weapon systems—such as catapult
equipment for aircraft carriers, sensor systems such as
hull-mounted sonar systems and sonobuoys for anti-submarine
warfare—and less advanced equipment which would free
resources for more sophisticated organic naval weapon
systems and more pressing naval programs, such as ship
repair facilities. The Japanese, for example, sold the
Soviets a very large floating dry-dock for civil use in
1978, but almost immediately after delivery it was not sur-
prisingly diverted for military use in support of the Soviet
Pacific fleet at Vladivostok. The Soviets bought a similar
dry-dock from Scandinavia, and it ended up with the Soviet
Northern fleet at Murmansk in 1981. These dry-docks are
said to be large enough to accommodate several small war-
ships at a time, and are the only dry-dock facilities for
the Pacific and Northern fleets capable of accommodating the
Kiev-class aircraft carriers.
The Soviets have a tremendous capability to project
power with amphibious beach landings. This ability has been
enhanced once again by Western technology. The Soviets
acquired sophisticated roll on/roll off (RoRo) ramps
developed in Britain, France, and Finland, and directly
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incorporated in Finnish ships built for the USSR. The
Soviet Union has also bought oceanographic ships from
Western yards, and, though U.S. equipment for them was
embargoed because of security reasons, alternative technolo-
gy was available and supplied by other Western countries.
If this was not enough, it is well-known by the entire
Western world that not only do the Soviet oceanographic
fleet have a very important military role, but in time of
war these ships will actually be the front line of the
Soviet submarine warfare effort. It should be pointed out,
if it is not already clearly evident, that be it a research
vessel, a fishing boat, a cargo container ship or even a
cruise ship, they all have a definite military mission and
any Western technology that is transferred to the East with
supposedly only civil maritime use intended can in the end
be traced to contributing to the Soviet military effort,
either indirectly, or surprisingly enough more often
directly, against the West.
As with Soviet aviation, the Soviet Navy also has some
peculiar and curious similarities in weapon system design
when compared to Western designs. The Yankee SSBN subma-
rine, the backbone of the Soviet SLBM force for years, was
probably not just a coincidental twin of the American Los
Angeles class SSBN. With the Soviet introduction of
American "style" aircraft carriers we also see similar
support technologies as already mentioned in catapult gear
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as well as systems and tactics to support a carrier battle
group such as Western "style" underway replenishment and
dispersed battle group formations.
The Soviet maritime strategy is clearly different from
that of the West and therefore the similarities are not
likely to be as blatantly obvious as they are in other areas
of Soviet military and industrial interests, but, nonethe-
less, Soviet exploitation of reckless Western concern for
the security of its technologies will take place and find a
place in weapon systems directed against the West in which
these technologies were born.
E. TACTICAL SYSTEMS
According to the CIA, Western tank, anti-tank, and air
defense systems have been of interest to the Soviet Union
which has sought to design countermeasures . According to
the CIA, the Soviet SA-7 heat-seeking, shoulder-fired anti-
aircraft missile contains many features of the U.S. Redeye
missile. In fact, some sources speculate that the SA-7
might actually contain electronic hardware in the form of
circuit boards, electronic components, and other sub-systems
that were actually produced in the West! The United States
is also concerned over the Soviet Union's acguisition of
Sidewinder missiles through its espionage channels a few
years ago and the effect that this could have not only on
Soviet missile technology, but Soviet anti-missile capabili-
ties against Western missiles as well.
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F. MICROELECTRONICS AND COMPUTERS
The CIA claims that the Soviet Union now has enough
Western equipment and knowledge to meet all of its military
microelectronic needs and about fifty percent of her total
microelectronic needs. Sonobuoys, which are often dropped
by Soviet planes, ships, and submarines in large numbers and
often recovered by the West, have provided Western analysts
a valuable and accurate look at Soviet microelectronic tech-
nology and have revealed numerous sobering surprises. One
such sonobuoy recovered by a group of boy scouts in Puget
Sound was marked 'PROPERTY OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES'
(in English) and was evidently used to track U.S. Trident
submarines to and from their Puget Sound base. 1 ^ The
electronic components inside were reported as being of U.S.
design, to the point of replicating some known defects in
the U.S. components. Another Soviet buoy was said to have
U.S . -designed components which were planned, but not yet
incorporated into, U.S. sonobuoy designs. 20
The Soviet RYAD series computer is reported to be based
on the IBM 360 and 370 designs and the CIA reports that the
Soviet Union and her allies have, since the early 1970 's,
apparently bought more than 3,000 Western manufactured
19 Buchan, "Western Society and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 15.
20Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 15.
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As discussed above, the U.S. government has concerned
itself of late with the continuing military build-up in the
Soviet Union and the relationship this build-up has with
East-West trade and technology transfer. President Reagan
has argued that the Soviet military effort was benefitting
significantly from the acquisition of U.S. and Western tech-
nology. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger warned that
the Soviets "have organized a massive, systematic effort to
get advanced technology from the West. The purpose is to
support the Soviet military buildup." 22
The Western governments would be well-advised to heed
Secretary Weinberger's warning. It is in the Reagan Admin-
istration's belief that the Soviets are bent on attaining a
technological superiority over the West and they call atten-
tion to the shrinking gap of Western technological superior-
ity. The Soviets have taken advantage of the fact that it
has had access to Western technology both through legal and
illegal means. The Soviets, through deception of its true
purpose, have gained technology it said was destined for
21Buchan, "Western Security and Economic Strategy
Towards the East," p. 15.
22 Caspar Weinberger, "Technology Transfer to the Soviet
Union," The Wall Street Journal , January 12, 1982, p. 32.
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industrial objectives and in fact directed towards their
military programs. What they cannot obtain legally is often
acquired instead through covert means. The Reagan Adminis-
tration has stressed that the absence or weakness of Western
technology export controls has allowed the East access to
Western technology on an unprecedented scale.
Observers are quick to point to the evidence in hard
facts—how else can a nation with only forty percent of the
GNP of the United States, with poor indigenous technology,
and general inefficiency in its production sector, outpro-
duce the United States in every category of conventional and
nuclear weapons? 23 Dr. Miles Costick, President of the
Institute on Strategic Trade, told the U.S. Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs that it is possible because of the
process of East-West trade, i.e., the West through trading
with the East is actually helping the Soviets outpace the
United States in weapons production! As a result, he said,
the Soviet Union has seized a technological lead from the
United States in the following critical areas related to
military systems: titanium fabrication, ABM battle manage-
ment, ICBM "cold launch" capability, command-control-
communication (C 3 ) countermeasures and intelligence, air
defense missiles, anti-ship missiles, artillery rocket
23 Costick, Miles M. , before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs, September 24, 1980.
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launchers, chemical/biological warfare, mobile ballistic
missiles, ICBM payloads and yields, and more.
H. CONCLUSION
In 1977 the U.S. military services provided lists of the
militarily critical technologies (MCT) that were part of
current and projected weapon systems. Congress endorsed
these lists and initiated a critical technologies approach
to export controls in the Export Administration Act of 1979.
There is no simple and always infallible method in dealing
with export controls and technology transfer. There are
more exceptions to the rules than there are rules in this
area of tremendous strategic importance—to both sides! The
MCT approach, while far from perfect, should be seen as a
useful tool for calling attention to what is really critical
to the national interest and should be controlled. The MCT
list will help stem the flow of technology to the East that
could contribute directly to its military capabilities. The
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) countries, by observing this list, will ensure that
the Soviets are not able to simply go to our allies for
technology that we have restricted from Eastern consumption.
This has been one of the highest priorities of the COCOM,
and the member nations committed themselves to preserving
the West's technological lead at a high level meeting in
Paris in January 1982. Through actions like this, the
United States and its allies hope to maintain a
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technological superiority in their weapon systems to
preserve a credible counterforce to the quantitative
superiority of the Warsaw Pact.
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V. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS
AND THE THIRD WORLD
A. INTRODUCTION
Since peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and
the Western nations has gained prominence the USSR has
sought ways to compete for influence in the Third World.
Military assistance to the developing nations has emerged as
a key element in Soviet-American rivalry.
The Soviet's foreign policy towards the Third World
includes extensive efforts to penetrate the political
barriers through economic aid. However, to a greater degree
and quite a bit more covertly has been their aggressive
military aid program which we have seen marketed effectively
and developed into a successful foreign policy vehicle which
they have used to gain favor with the developing countries
of the world. The West cannot, however, say that they do
not use carrots of economic and military aid as the Soviets
do. We see both superpowers courting the Third World with
bouquets of planes and guns. This chapter will look at
these transfers of technology, subsequent re-transfers of
technology to the other camp, the consequences that this
breach of technological security to the enemy—East and/or
West
—
produces, and the steps that might be used in the West
to keep our losses to a minimum.
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B. SUPERPOWER ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE THIRD WORLD
The Soviets have placed a high degree of importance on
its "drive" into the Third World with its military aid
diplomacy (see Table 5.1). Since 1955 the USSR has poured
some $6 billion in arms into twenty-five developing nations
around the world. In the Middle East this massive arms flow
contributed to the outbreak in June 1967 of the third Arab-
Israeli war. 24 In Asia $1 billion in Soviet weapons
strengthened Indonesia in its confrontations with the
Netherlands and Malaysia. The world was given an example of
Soviet-Chinese estrangement when the Soviet-equipped Indian
forces faced Chinese communist troops along the Himalayan
frontier. In African countries such as Algeria, Libya, and
Somalia, to name but just a few, they enjoy bullets courtesy
of Moscow. In Central America we see Soviet influence
spreading from the seed they planted twenty-five years ago
in Cuba.
The United States, on the other hand, has also provided
an almost unlimited supply of arms to the developing coun-
tries of the world in direct competition with the Soviets to
keep the Third World from sliding into the East's camp.
Between the two major alliances, eighty-eight percent of all
arms exported throughout the world were manufactured by NATO
members, including France, and the Warsaw Pact. France is
24Wynfred Joshua, Arms for the Third World , The Johns




SHARES OF EXPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS TO THE
THIRD WORLD REGIONS BY SUPPLIER, 1962-81
(Percentages are based on SIPRI trend indicator
values, as expressed in US $ million, at
constant (1975) prices)
Country' 1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81
USA 29 34 38 37
USSR 42 42 33 33
France 9 7 10 12
Italy 1 1 2 5
UK 12 10 9 4
Others 7 6 8 9
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
TOTAL VALUE 7,870 14 ,583 25
;
,755 47 ,829
*Countries are listed in rank order according to their
shares for 1977-81.
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the world's third largest arms supplier. Close behind in
fourth, fifth and sixth places are the United Kingdom, West
Germany and Italy, respectively. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
countries contribute only 16 percent to the total Warsaw
Pact arms exports. Clearly, the Soviet Union dominates
Warsaw Pact arms exports. By comparison the United States'
arms exports were roughly equal to the combined arms exports
from other NATO countries25 (see Table 5.2).
C. ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST
During the period 1979-1983, fifty-five percent of the
world's total of arms transfers were directed to the Middle
East and Africa, the world's two poorest regions, whose
combined 1983 GNP was less than 6 percent of the world's
total. Of interest to strategists and those who concern
themselves with the military balances and security within
these regions is the remarkable increase from 24 percent in
1972 of the total of world arms exports to the Middle East
and Africa just before the first major oil crisis, to the
aforementioned 55 percent since 1979. Increased availabili-
ty of cash from higher oil revenues, coupled with the Soviet
penetration of the area through arms transfers to such coun-
tries as Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Angola, Iraq, and Syria,
have radically increased the share of these two regions in
25U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985 , ACDA
Publication 123, August 1985, p. 18.
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TABLE 5.2


















Sources: WMEAT (World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers), 1970-79, p. 127.
SIPRI Yearbook 1982, pp. 192-193.
ACDA figures based on current dollars; SIPRI
figures based on constant U.S. dollars.
55
the world's arms imports26 and adversely affected the
political climate and stability of the area.
What we see in the Middle East and Northern Africa is
the emergence of political butterflies from the cocoons of
what only 15 years ago were the economic basketbases and the
militarily insignificant caterpillars of the world. This
rapid growth and development has been a result of the indus-
trialized world showering these countries with economic aid
and courting them with military assistance to ensure that
the strategic value of their natural resources, more
directly-—'their OIL—remains available and accessible even
during conflicts within the region. This has resulted in
the desire by both Moscow and Washington to arm their
respective allies in the oil rich regions to the hilt
enabling them to not only protect themselves, but also
protect the interests of the superpowers themselves. Thus
the perfect opportunity for technology re-transfer to one's
respective enemy is set up through these new regional powers
not yet sure if they should be on the backs of camels or in
the cockpits of F-16 and MIG-25 fighter aircraft. Where
twentieth century technology has replaced medieval ways in a
scant fifteen years, it is easy to understand the problems
associated with technology transfer security. Since the
East is so intent to let the West do much of the R&D on its
26U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985 , p. 18.
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weapon systems, the Middle East and North Africa have become
a natural bargain basement for Moscow in collecting Western
military and industrial technology for reverse engineering
projects and the like.
The Soviets and their Russian Tsar predecessors have
looked for a presence in the region for a long time. More
than two and one-half centuries ago Peter the Great dreamed
of extending his empire's influence into the Middle East.
His successors tried from time to time to realize that
vision. During much of the nineteenth century the Russians
competed with the major European powers in the Middle East,
but by the turn of the century Britain had emerged as the
most powerful external influence in the region and retained
that position until the end of World War II.
The postwar period brought renewed Soviet efforts to
penetrate the Middle East. The Soviet rival became primar-
ily the United States, while the impact of the British and
French presence gradually grew weaker. In the contest
between the United States and the Soviet Union, military
assistance and economic aid became increasingly important
elements in the Middle East. Between 1955 and 1968 the
Soviet Union channeled about $3 billion in arms aid to the
Middle East, or almost fifty percent of its total military
assistance to the developing world27 (see Table 5.3).
27Joshua, Arms for the Third World , p. 7
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TABLE 5.3
SHARES OF IMPORTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS
BY THE THIRD WORLD
(BY REGION, 1962-1981)
Percentages are based on SIPRI trend indicator
values, as expressed in US $ million,
at constant (1975) prices
Region 1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81
Middle East 28 46 51 44
Africa 15 16 24
Far East 31 27 15 13
Latin America 12 11 11
South Asia 14 11
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
TOTAL VALUE 7,870 14,583 25,775 47,829
'Regions are listed in rank order according to their
shares for 1977-81.
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D. VEHICLES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
In 1955 Egypt became the first country with which the
Soviet Union established a military aid relationship.
Through the years, Cairo remained on the receiving end of
bountiful Soviet arms aid packages. Of all military aid
recipients Egypt received the largest dollar value of Soviet
and Eastern European shipment in the region, estimated at
the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 at
approximately $1.5 billion. 28 To fill the vacuum and mili-
tary imbalance left by the Soviet arms aid to Egypt, the
United States supplied Israel with arms as well. Both
Moscow and Washington, aware of the delicate situation and
the possibility of an escalation in the region that could
possibly bring a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation, worked as
if walking on egg shells to avoid such a confrontation. The
details of the Arab-Israeli war are beyond the scope of this
paper, but the consequences of the Soviet aid to Egypt and
Egypt's subsequent change of political camps to the West's,
is another example of a method that provided an avenue of
technology transfer from East to West. Little new technolo-
gy was gained by the West's examination of the Soviet-made
hardware, but a look at Soviet technology provided the West
with intelligence that would allow us to make an appraisal
of how effective Western hardware would be against the
East's. A similar transfer, but of much greater value,
28Joshua, Arms for the Third World , p. 8.
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occurred after the U.S. withdrawal from South Viet Nam—the
military hardware left behind was a virtual treasure chest
of technology for the North Viet Nam's big brother in Moscow
(yet another example of how the West comes up on the short
end of the technology transfer process—the Soviets were
able to gain not only intelligence from the material left in
Viet Nam, but also new technology—technology that would
allow the Soviets to improve on their own, again, at our
expense! )
.
Another vehicle for technology transfer is through com-
mercial trade channels. But, despite the rapid increase of
East-West trade, the United States accounts for only fifteen
percent of total Soviet imports, and less than nine percent
of the advanced technology purchased by the Soviets29 (see
Table 5.4). Agricultural commodities account for 75-80




This chapter has shown how the United States and the
Soviet Union have competed for influence in the Third World
through arms transfers and other military and economic aid.
The instability that is usually associated with Third World
Governments has provided unique vehicles for technology
transfers between the superpowers—albeit unintentional and
29Gordon B. Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade ,
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at times damaging to the security of the source nation. The
political benefits for the time being, anyway, seem to out-
weigh the security risks involved in competing for a
presence in the Third World by providing military and
economic aid in return.
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VI. SOVIET TRADE WITH THE WEST
A. INTRODUCTION
The composition of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union con-
trasts dramatically with that of other Western nations.
Since 1973 the largest Western trading partner with the
Soviet Union has been the Federal Republic of Germany.
German exports to the U.S.S.R. constitute over twenty
percent of all Soviet imports, followed by Japan, the U.S.,
France, and Italy. Germany provides almost one-third of all
high technology purchased by the Soviets, followed by Japan,
France, Italy, Finland, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden,
and the United States. 30
B. SOVIET EXPORTS TO THE WEST
Soviet exports to Western Europe and the United States,
although small in total volume, are not inconsequential.
The Soviet Union is the world's largest oil and gas
producing country, currently averaging more than twelve
million barrels of oil per day. The Soviet Union ranks
second behind Saudi Arabia for total oil and gas exports.
In 1979 the Soviets exported 43 million metric tons of oil
to Western countries, earning an estimated $7 billion. 31
30Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 4.
31Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
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Germany relies on Soviet gas for 14-17 percent of its gas
consumption, while Italy draws almost 29 percent and Austria
59 percent of their gas from the U.S.S.R. 32 The Europeans
are actively seeking to expand gas deliveries with the con-
struction of the Yamburg pipeline. The pipeline will extend
from the giant gas fields of the Yamal Peninsula in north-
west Siberia 3,600 miles to Western Europe. The project,
which is estimated to cost $15 billion, will increase the
level of Soviet gas used by Germany, Belgium, Italy, and
France to almost 30 percent. 33 Although they are hesitant
to increase their dependence on Soviet energy sources, the
West Europeans feel that it is in their best interest to
diversify their portfolio of energy suppliers and lessen
their reliance on OPEC. The United States does not import
oil or gas from the U.S.S.R., although a liguified natural
gas project was considered but killed in 1974 by Congres-
sional restrictions on extending credits to the Soviet
Union. 34
The Soviets, however, do export to the U.S. many rare
metals and ores, some of which have direct strategic uses.
Gold bullion accounts for almost two-thirds of American
imports from the Soviet Union. The Soviets export gold to
pay for American grain and technology. The Soviets also
32 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
33 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
34 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
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export to the U.S. many rare metals and ores, some of which
have direct strategic uses. According to the Commerce
Department's report on Soviet-American trade for 1980, the
U.S. imported more than $43.5 million in Soviet uranium, or
ten percent of U.S. imports from the Soviet Union that
year. 35 The Soviets also export to the U.S. chromium and
vanadium, used in hardening alloys for armor plate; platinum
used in computer microchips; and rhodium and palladium
widely used catalysts with applications in fuel refining. 36
By contrast, the export of American uranium or strategic
metals to the Soviet Union is banned for obvious political
reasons. 37
C. SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION
The United States benefits not only from trade with the
Soviet Union, but also from cooperation in the fields of
science and technology. At the high point of detente eleven
bilateral science and technology agreements were signed
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. encompassing some 3 00
projects. The most heralded example of U.S. -Soviet scien-
tific cooperation was the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz joint space
flight. These scientific projects have proven to be
mutually beneficial. For example, experiments were
35Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
36Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
37 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 5.
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conducted in Moscow on a magneto-hydrodynamic device manu-
factured by Soviet engineers, utilizing a U. S . -produced 40-
ton superconducting magnet. The data resulting from the
experiments will enable American scientists to overcome
several engineering problems. As a result of another joint
research project the U.S. saved an estimated $10 million and
two years of research by cooperating with the Soviets on
mirror fusion. 38 More recently, and with less success was
the cooperation and assistance provided to Moscow by the
West in the Chernobyl nuclear accident in fighting a nuclear
fire and treating radiation injuries and sickness. Other
areas of cooperation include weather forecasting, germplasm
research, biomedical problems of manned space flight, remote
sensing of agricultural crops and other vegetation, oceano-
graphic research, plasma physics, and treatment of heart
attack patients using nitrous oxide and hyaluronidase, to
name a few. However, in order to express official censure
over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition
of martial law in Poland, the Reagan Administration
announced that the cooperative agreements with the Soviet
Union in science and technology would not be renewed when
they expired in 1982 and 1983. 39
38 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 6
39 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 6
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D. WESTERN SECURITY CONCERNS
So, in 1986 and into the foreseeable future, East-West
trade and technical cooperation are stunted due to the
political implications of the time. This has, according to
the CIA, caused a stepped-up effort by the Soviets to keep
Western technology flowing eastward through more covert and
devious methods—the Soviets are determined to continue at
least a one-way technology exchange with the West in spite
of our efforts, or more correctly stated, probably with more
vigor because of the political differences that have caused
the disappearance of the detente era exchange that both
sides seemed to enjoy in the 1970 's.
A legitimate concern regarding East-West commercial
relations is the possibility that the Soviets may divert
Western technology to military applications. Donald J.
Goldstein estimates that as many as 150 Soviet weapons
systems contain Western technology. What has been dubbed
"dual use" technologies are the areas of interest to
Goldstein and other government officials that represent the
single most troublesome aspect of export controls. For
example, in 1981 the Soviets placed an order with a Cali-
fornia company for a machine that tests the hardness of
concrete structures. The instrument is normally used in
testing the hardness of concrete bridge abutments, building
foundations, and walls. During the export license review
that is routine for all high technology sales to East
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European countries and the U.S.S.R., Defense Department
analysts discovered that the instrument utilized a technolo-
gy similar to that employed by the U.S. Air Force in testing
the "hardening" of missile silos. The license was denied. 40
Some dual use technologies have very narrow and specific
uses, while others have a broad range of applications. For
example, in 1975 several Western corporations contracted to
build a giant truck factory along the Kama River in the
Soviet Union. U.S. intelligence experts now believe that
trucks manufactured at the plant were used to haul Soviet
troops and supplies into Afghanistan. Although trucks can
be used in military operations, they are not generally
considered "military hardware." 41
The Department of Defense has become more interested in
East-West economic relations. Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger recently stated
The ability of the United States and its allies to respond
to the threat from the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact countries
is dependent directly on the technological superiority of
the West. Our forces have fewer men and weapon systems
than our adversaries, and the West has become comfortable
with the idea that it can maintain the balance of power
with fewer, quantitatively superior weapons. But the
Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat has increased as Soviet tech-
nology has advanced and the technological superiority of
the West has eroded. While the Western technological lead
continues to be sufficient to maintain a viable military
balance for the present, there is grave concern that the
40Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 7.
41Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 8.
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balance is shifting towards the Soviets. A flow of
Western technology to the East has given—and continues to
give—major impetus to that shift.
So, why is the Department of Defense interested in East-
West economic relations? They are interested because this
is an area of international economics where strategic con-
siderations must be taken into account and where a policy
based on commercial considerations alone may seriously
undermine the national security of the United States and of
our allies.
Soviet economic gains from international trade are
heavily weighted on the side of the military community which
in effect allows the East to threaten the West with its own
technology. As discussed earlier, the Soviets have been
importing—by legal as well as illegal means—Western tech-
nology that they continue to assure us will be used in only
civilian applications, yet the CIA reports that much of this
imported technology is going directly into their military




This point was clearly brought out in a March 198 3
Department of Defense report, Soviet Military Power :
The flow of Western technology, equipment and
materials to the Soviet Union has made a considerable con-
tribution to Soviet military-industrial capabilities.
Industrial machinery and products for the civilian indus-
try often directly support the defense industries. Since
a significant amount of defense production occurs in the
machinery sector, it is likely that at least half of the
42 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 160
70
machinery acquired from the West contributes to defense
production . . . and greatly facilitated the development
and serial production of modern weapons. For example,
since the mid-1970' s, the U.S., its Western allies and
Japan together have been the source of one-fourth of total
Soviet machinery imports. This one-fourth represents the
most advanced machinery that the Soviets have been able to
acquire. More than 40 percent of these Western machinery
imports have been for the metalworking and chemical indus-
tries—major contributors to Soviet defense production.
Much of the remainder of Soviet machinery imports were
acquired from East European sources, the technology of





Secretary Weinberger has drawn specific strategic impli-
cations from these facts of international economic life. He
has noted that the assistance which East-West trade provides
to Soviet military growth increases the threat to Western
security and the cost of the defense burden borne by the
American and European taxpayer. The Secretary has stated
that because trade with the West affects the Soviet economy,
we and our allies must devise trade policies "with full
awareness of the security interests at stake." He adds that
although the West may gain some economic benefits from these
trade relations, leaving them to be determined by private
market forces is bound to work to the disadvantage of the
West. 44
43 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1983 ,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March
1983, pp. 75-76.
44 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power , Second
Edition, March 1983, p. 75.
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TABLE 6.1 45
SOVIET IMPORTS FROM NATO COUNTRIES AND JAPAN BY MAJOR






















•^These imports of Western chemical equipment represent 67
percent of the total Soviet investment in chemical equipment
over the 5-year period 1976-1980.
2 Includes over 20 sub-branches of machinery production,
ranging from power machinery and precision instrumentation
to machinery for the light and food industries.
45Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1983 ,
76.
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This last viewpoint is fully shared by our NATO allies.
The June, 1983 NATO Council communique specifically noted
that East-West economic relations have security implications
and should be conducted on a commercially sound and mutually
advantageous basis. NATO pointed out
bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the
countries of Eastern Europe must be consistent with broad
allied security concerns. These include avoiding depen-
dence on the Soviet Union or contributing to Soviet mili-
tary capabilities. . . . The allies will remain vigilant
in their continuing review of the security aspects of
East-West economic relations. 46
Thus, the Department of Defense and the Reagan Adminis-
tration as a whole favor a carefully balanced combination of
commercial and strategic considerations in developing trade
policy toward the Soviet bloc. The Reagan Administration
rejects both the extremes of economic warfare and the indis-
criminate trade with our adversary. In line with the
President's commitment to free international trade and
peaceful relations among all countries, the Administration
does not favor trade as a weapon. There is no intention of
trying to exacerbate endemic weaknesses in the Soviet econo-
my. The Administration favors continued trade with the
Soviet bloc where this works to the advantage of our country
and of our citizens. For example, the U.S. negotiated a
46See NATO, North Atlantic Council, NATO Information
Service , Brussels, 1981- . . . Texts of communiques and




long-term grain agreement with the U.S.S.R., signed by
Agriculture Secretary Block in Moscow in August 1983. 47
But the Administration is also tightening the reigns in
areas where economic gains to the West are offset by
strategic losses. President Reagan has made clear that we
will not again allow our hopes for greater political and
economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R. to obscure the reali-
ties of continuing political and military competition.
Therefore, in assessing East-West trade proposals, he feels
the U.S. must balance the potential economic benefits to
certain firms and economic sectors against the possible
losses to Western security. 48
The Administration is seeking a long-term American and
alliance strategy on East-West economic relations that has
the coherence and depth of our military strategy. Specific
economic measures should be keyed to this perspective and
not merely to immediate events, such as those taking place
in Poland and Afghanistan. It is interesting to note that
two prominent Americans with much experience in internation-
al economic relations have recently adopted a similar posi-
tion. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a speech
before the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and
International Studies has called for greater emphasis on
economic security in NATO policy-making. In November of
47Joshua, Arms for the Third World , p. 163.
48 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 164.
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1982, Henry Ford II told the American Chamber of Commerce in
London that the time had come
for the countries in the Western alliance ... to develop
a strategy and a mechanism for enhancing our economic
security in the same way we fashioned NATO in 1949 to
enhance our military security.
Ford stated that Western businesses, as well as governments,
would benefit from an "economic NATO" that would allow the
democracies "collectively to respond to the economic strate-
gies of the East." 49
The turning point in U.S. policy on East-West trade came
with the end of the dispute over the Siberian gas pipeline.
The President's firm stand against the Siberian pipeline and
his sanctions against the sale of oil and gas technology to
the Soviets were withdrawn after intensive discussions with
our allies. However, they led to a common Western review of
policies toward East-West trade. The United States and its
allies have reached new agreements on overall East-West
trade in NATO, on energy security in the International
Energy Agency, on subsidized credits in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , and on the
transfer of strategic technology in the International Coor-
dinating Committee (COCOM) in Paris. 50
49 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 164
50Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 164
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E. CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined Soviet trade with the West and
some of the mechanisms that are involved in trading with an
enemy. The use of sanctions and other measures to reduce
the security risks involved usually results in the Western
allies reconsidering the efficiency and practicality of such
actions and as a result we enter into new phases and varia-
tions of East-West trade.
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VII. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONCERNS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Defense Department has specific concerns in each of
three general areas—credits, energy, and technology
transfer. 51 This chapter will look at these three areas
and their effects on U.S. national security.
B. CREDITS
Our overall goal is to reduce the benefits of East-West
trade to the Soviet "military machine." To accomplish this,
the most direct method would be to terminate Western loans
to the Soviet Union. The significance of officially
supported credits goes far beyond the relatively small
amounts of lending actually extended by Western governments.
The Soviet bloc is in serious financial trouble. Countries
such as Poland, Romania, and East Germany may never,
according to some reports, be able to repay their burgeoning
debts to the West. As a result, Western banks have all but
ended any new lending to East European countries. The
Soviets, themselves, face dire economic straits. Without
the continuation of officially supported Western credits to
the U.S.S.R., Western banks will likely abstain from further
lending to Moscow. Under these circumstances, the
51 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 164
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Administration sees the encouragement of additional Western
lending to Moscow as financially imprudent and politically
indefensible (see Table 7.1).
The goal of the Reagan Administration is to put East-
West trade on a more businesslike foundation based on the
changing political and strategic environment. It is time to
put a stop to the unseemly competition between Western
states for soviet trade, including cut-rate credit offers.
The most dramatic example of such is Soviet energy develop-
ment projects. If the Soviets are a good credit risk, let
them pay the prevailing market rates! If they are as poor a
credit risk as I have hinted at, let them pay cash! An
agreement by OECD members in 1983 to change the interest
rates that the Soviets must pay has gone a long way towards
ending the most unreasonable subsidies which Moscow received
during the 1970 's. President Reagan appears to be willing
to continue these efforts and is attempting to get more of
our allies on board in supporting his efforts.
There is also a domestic side to this predicament—the
question of judgment in providing subsidizing credits to the
Soviet Union. At a time when Western economies in many
parts of the world are still recovering from a severe reces-
sion, it is unfair that Western taxpayers should have to






















































































































































































































































well as paying the cost of responding to the Soviet threat
with an expensive defensive buildup of their own. 52
C . ENERGY
Second, the Defense Department is concerned about stra-
tegic implications of Western dependence on Soviet energy.
There are two problems here. First, Soviet energy exports
help finance the Soviet military buildup. Indeed, over one-
half of all Soviet foreign exchange earnings come from oil
and gas exports to the West, primarily Europe. The Soviet
system is much less efficient in the civilian sector than is
the military. For the last decade the U.S.S.R. has sought
to remedy this defect in its economic system by buying both
goods and know-how in the West. For this the Soviets need a
steady stream of hard currency from the West. In the past,
they could supplement their sales of raw materials by
borrowing from Western governments and financial institu-
tions. Now, with the growth of both the Soviet and Eastern
European debt, this is less possible. Energy exports to
Western Europe have become all the more critical to Moscow
and help it avoid the choice between guns and butter.
Moreover, increased Western dependence on Soviet energy
exports will give the Soviets a potential critical strategic
leverage against NATO. In principle, each side could use
the energy relationship for leverage against the other; in
52 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 165
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fact, the differences between democratic and authoritarian
political systems indicate that Western European governments
would be more sensitive to a threatened cutoff of, or
reduction in, energy supplies than the Soviets would be to a
threatened loss of hard currency earnings from those sales.
Consumer demands on European governments would be supple-
mented by demands from business and labor groups nervous
about the possible loss of future profits and jobs associat-
ed with the sale of steel pipe and other energy-related
equipment to the Soviet Union. This suggests that Soviet
hints of a cutoff or slowdown in oil and gas delivery
—
couched, of course, in terms of "technical problems" or
"emergency domestic requirements"—could bring about impor-
tant Western concessions on economic or even security
issues
.
It is interesting to note that in 1980 the Soviets
stated that Western Europe and Japan would risk losing
Soviet fuel supplies if they joined the U.S. -led economic
sanctions imposed after the invasion of Afghanistan. This
may have been one factor in European hesitation to support
the sanctions strongly.
These considerations explain why the United States and
its allies are working toward more rapid development of
indigenous Western energy sources. The U.S. has attempted
to encourage the development of North Sea energy sources,
particularly gas. It is clear that Western economic
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recovery and security will be more stable if Western coun-
tries invest in North Sea energy development than if they
continue to subsidize the build-up of the Soviet energy
infrastructure. 53 This appears to be a battle that the
Reagan Administration will win in the long run.
D. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
As already discussed in Chapter IV, the most critical
area of specific Defense Department concern in East-West
economic relations is the question of the transfer of
militarily-applicable Western technology to the Soviet
Union.
Behind the open Soviet-Western competition in specific
weapon systems there is a less well-known but vital rivalry
—what we might call a "quiet war" for superiority in mili-
tary technology. This is a war in which the Soviet bloc
supplements its own technological advances by a major effort
to acquire militarily-applicable Western technology. It is
a competition in which the Soviet Union tries to turn the
openness and freedom of Western societies against the West.
In turn, the West tries to protect its technological edge,
and hence its military security, without infringing upon
legitimate East-West trade.
The United States Government is concerned about technol-
ogy transfer because of the many military implications
53 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 166
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associated with this type of transfer. Soviet leaders know
that the West has always counted on its technological edge
to offset the Eastern lead in numbers of weapons and in man-
power. If the Soviets can neutralize this edge, they can
achieve overall military superiority.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Pearle has
pointed out, the Soviets gain great benefits from exploiting
Western technology by saving research time and money, avoid-
ing our mistakes, and knowing in advance which technologies
are proven and likely to work. He notes that, "At no previ-
ous time in history has one nation been able to prey so
deeply and systematically on the fruits of its adversary's
genius and labor. "^ 4
The Soviet effort to acquire this technology has been
wide-ranging and thorough. The Soviet Union has used three
major approaches: legal purchases of militarily-applicable
Western technology; illegal acquisition of technology
through violation of export laws and through espionage; and
exploitation of open sources of information. The results
have been impressive from the Soviet standpoint; distressing
from our own. U.S. defense experts are alarmed by the num-
ber of Soviet weapon systems that contain Western technolo-
gy, including missile guidance systems, night-vision
devices, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sonobuoys.
54Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "Cutting Russia's Harvest of
U.S. Technology," Fortune , May 30, 1983, p. 112.
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Over the past 15 years, the Soviets have acquired from
the West technical capabilities offering a significant con-
tribution to their military build-up and defense industries.
In certain fields, the Soviet bloc has narrowed its
technology gap with the West from 10 years to within two
years—and has done so in just the past three or four years.
As Bob Raggett, the yearbook editor of Jane's Military
Communications , observed, "The irony of the situation is
that the more advanced and sophisticated Western electronic
hardware becomes, the easier it becomes for the Soviet Union
to acquire it." 55 For example, a decade ago the U.S.S.R.
was very weak in microelectronics and computer technology.
Raggett verifies that "Advanced Western component and inte-
grated circuit manufacturers . . . have discovered direct
copies of their classified circuit chips in Soviet electron-
ic equipment." 56 Yet, aware that NATO forces depend exten-
sively on microelectronics and computers for everything from
smart weapons to command and control, the Soviets sought to
import the key technical and industrial elements to give
them a similar capability. Today, the result of these
efforts is becoming evident. Soviet strategic and conven-
tional weapons are using Western microelectronics and
Western computer designs to enhance their performance. In
the Spring of 1983 West German TV viewers were surprised
55Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 3.
56Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 171.
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when they were told that half of the technology in the
Soviet SS-20's aimed at them came from the West. 57
To help counter this challenge the Department of
Defense, in cooperation with other federal agencies, has
undertaken major programs at home and internationally to
curb what until recently had been a virtual hemorrhage of
strategic technology to the East. The export control pro-
gram of the Reagan Administration has stressed three main
elements: First, strengthening our domestic programs by
improving efficiency, building up analytical and informa-
tional skills and tightening enforcement, including the
highly successful Project Exodus, run by the U.S. Customs
Service. Second, improving the international technology
control program which is centered in the International
Coordinating Committee (COCOM) . Proposals have been
presented to strengthen controls over key technologies and
undertake institutional changes that will tighten enforce-
ment by member nations. Third, stemming the flow of tech-
nology through conduits outside the COCOM system—that is,
through neutral and non-aligned nations which have become
favored illegal re-export points for moving Western high
technology equipment into the Soviet bloc. 58
57 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 171
58 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 173
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E. CONCLUSION
Thus, American efforts at export control and limiting
the extension of credits to the Soviet bloc and Western
energy security are parts of an overall program to establish
an appropriate balance between commercial and strategic con-
siderations in our East-West trade policy. They represent a
middle course that takes account of the strategic importance
of trade with the East but rejects a return to the extensive
and cumbersome controls of the Cold War. 59
59 Smith, The Politics of East-West Trade , p. 173
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VIII. THE EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
A. INTRODUCTION
The present state of U.S. trade policy toward Communist
nations reflects the ambivalence and dissension which has
characterized the U.S. position towards the Eastern bloc
during the past thirty years. Most of the basis for present
trade programs were designed at the height of the Cold War
—
a period in which suspicions ran high with regard to the
Communist world's intentions. The early trade legislation
was designed to throw a virtual trade embargo net over the
Soviet Union and its allies. Since that time, however,
history has changed several things that require a new look
at these policies: 1) the United States has lost much of
its leverage with its Western trading partners and is no
longer able to impose a unified trading posture within the
Western alliance; 2) the communist nations themselves are
now more independent and free of its apron strings to Moscow
and as a result cannot be treated as a monolithic bloc of
communist nations; and 3) there has been an overall improve-
ment in East-West relations. Together, these developments
have led to changes in the way that the West deals with the
Communist world and the policies that have been developed to
guide these relations so as to avoid unnecessary security
risks and undue economic hardships in dealing with the East.
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This chapter will explore the history of Western export and
licensing controls from the Export Control Act of 1949
through the policies of the 1980' s. In this chapter and
throughout this study these issues will be critigued and
substitutes will be offered to our present policies.
B. LAWS AND AMENDMENTS
When the United States decided to exert strict peacetime
controls over its exports to certain countries in the name
of national security, it entered into a new era of U.S.
foreign and national security policy. The Trading With the
Enemy Act of 1917 granted the President power to impose ex-
port controls in time of war or, with the consent of
Congress, national emergency.
At the end of World War II, the Export Control Act of
1949 emphasized the danger to U.S. national security of the
unrestricted export of materials without regard to their
potential military significance and declared it to be the
policy of the United States to "exercise the necessary vigi-
lance" over exports to deny militarily useful exports to the
Soviet Union and its allies. The effect of this act was to
make exporting a privilege and not a right, and it signaled
a policy in which national security considerations took
precedence over the economic advantages of foreign trade. 60
60See R.J. Carrick, East-West Technology Transfer in
Perspective , Policy Papers in International Affairs, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, California, 1978, p. 25.
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In October 1951, the United States attempted to enforce
a united Allied approach to trade with the Communist bloc
with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951, also known as the Battle Act (Public Law 87-
195) . The Battle Act had two purposes. First, it reaffirm-
ed the objectives of the Export Control Act by clearly-
stating a policy in which trade was to be used as a weapon
against the Soviet bloc. This act declared it to be U.S.
policy to regulate the export of commodities other than
arms, ammunition, implements of war, etc., "to oppose and
offset by nonmilitary action acts which threatened the
security of the United States and the peace of the world"
(sec. 201)
.
But of even more significance was that the Battle Act
formally announced the intention of the United States to
seek multilateral cooperation in the implementation of this
policy.
Unfortunately, Allied response to the Battle Act was
never enthusiastic. Europeans could not accept that denying
trade with the East would put an end to communism or even
curtail the Communist countries' development. In more prag-
matic terms, trade with Eastern Europe was a matter of no
small consequence to our West European partners. 61
61Hearings on H.R. 4293 to extend and amend the Export
Control Act of 1949, Committee on Banking and Currency,
1969, p. 4.
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During the early 19 60's, pressure from Europe and from
some parts of the U.S. business community led to a major
reevaluation of U.S. export policy.
President Kennedy, for example, in his January 30, 1961
State of the Union address, requested greater discretion for
using "economic tools ... to help reestablish historic
ties of friendship" between the United States and the
Eastern bloc whenever this was "clearly in the national
interest." 62 In order to facilitate any resulting trade,
Kennedy ordered the formation of the Export Control Review
Board, a cabinet-level body that would review and consider
the merit of applications for exports to the Communist
world. In any event, however, the Cold War had not thawed
enough and there was no major change in policy during the
1960's.
By the time of the first Nixon Administration, however,
the policy of "economic warfare" had come under increasing
attack. The economic leverage on which the Battle Act
relied had been greatly diminished by the rapid reconstruc-
tion of the Japanese and West European economies and the
subsequent reduction in their need for U.S. aid. By now
Americans were growing weary of the Cold War and coupled
with their frustration in not being able to compete with the
Japanese and West Europeans in the Communist marketplace
62 Department of State, The Battle Act in New Times ,
15th Report to Congress, p. 5.
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because of the Battle Act restrictions, Congress responded
in their behalf. Also, in consideration of the exploding
balance of payments deficit and the growing commercial value
of an East-West trade that the U.S. was not participating
in, Congress saw fit to liberalize export controls. This
resulted in the passage of the Export Administration act of
1969 (Public Law 91-184) . This act symbolized the attempt
to achieve a new emphasis for export controls—to move away
from restrictive embargoes towards a carefully planned
expansion of exports to the Soviet Union and its allies.
The Export Administration Act expired in 1972, at which
time it was amended and extended until 1974 by the Equal
Export Opportunity Act (Public Law 92-412). Consideration
of the Export Administration Act in 1974 occurred in the
aftermath of the OPEC oil embargo, economic recession, and
serious domestic shortages in several commodities. Although
the discussions in both Houses were understandably dominated
by the issue of short supply controls, Congress also passed
amendments that had an impact on the transfer of technology
through national security and foreign policy controls.
At the height of detente, many U.S. companies entered
into technical cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union,
some of which called for the exchange of pure, uncensored
technology. Under the existing legislation the Department
of Commerce and other agencies of the Government concerned
with export control were not informed of the details of
91
these technical cooperation agreements until they led to
application for export licenses. This made it difficult for
the Government to effectively discharge its export control
responsibility.
A final amendment called for review by the Secretary of
Defense of all exports to "controlled" countries (i.e.,
Communist countries) . The Secretary was empowered to recom-
mend to the President disapproval of any export if it would
significantly increase the military capability of a
controlled country. A Presidential decision to override the
Secretary of Defense was to be submitted to Congress, which
had 3 days in which to overrule the President's decision by
majority vote. These provisions were designed "to ensure
that DOD has an adequate opportunity to consider the mili-
tary and national security implications of exports to Com-
munist countries and that the Congress has a voice in the
decision in the event of White House and DOD disagreement. 63
The 1977 amendments extended the Export Administration
Act until September 30, 1979. But by September 1978,
attempts were already underway in the House of Representa-
tives to produce legislation that would impose conditions
more restrictive to the growth of East-West trade.
Ultimately, after much debate, H.R. 4034 reported out of
committee. It explicitly distinguished the criteria and
63U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, Export Administration Act Amendments of
1974, Report No. 93-1024, July 22, 1974, p. 9.
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procedures in the use of national security and foreign
policy export controls. National security controls were
designed to "
. . . prevent the acquisition or delay (the
acquisition) by hostile or potentially hostile countries of
goods and technology which would significantly enhance their




C. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
The present Export Administration Act is the embodiment
of a policy of encouraging trade with the Communist world.
The Government purports that it is designed to also protect
U.S. national security and allows the President flexibility
in the use of export controls to further foreign policy
aims. The fact is, that time and time again the use of
trade and technology "sticks" and "carrots" as a foreign
policy tool in dealing with the Communist camp is a lost
cause. The fact that there have been so many amendments and
changes to the Act over the years should say something to
the effectiveness of this policy. Let us remember, the
technology we allow the Soviets and their allies access to,
will in turn one day be aimed back at us in the form of a
weapon system—the West is in conflict with the East— it may
be a peaceful conflict today, but who can say that tomorrow
64House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the
Export Administration Act Amendments of 1979 , Report No. 96-
200, May 15, 1979, p. 7.
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it will not change into a hostile conflict? The Communist
world is the West's enemy— like it or not, they will remain
our enemy until one of the two social systems change. And
this is not likely to occur by peaceful means—so I must
question our wisdom in supporting a policy that encourages
trade with our enemy.
The answer is possibly not as far to the right as I may
appear to be standing. But it is certainly not as liberal
as our present policy. It, in my opinion, lies somewhere
close to the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act or Battle
Act of 1951. Richard Pearle correctly appraises the situa-
tion by suggesting that the security of the United States,
its allies and its friends depends to a significant degree
on the West's ability to preserve its advantage over the
Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations in militarily
relevant technology. He goes on to say, that if the West is
to maintain a margin of safety, it will have to be a tech-
nological margin. 65 Should the West fail to take such
action, the prospect is for a continuing erosion of our
qualitative lead, which could ultimately turn the West's
margin of security into a Soviet margin of decisive
advantage.
65Richard Pearle, "The Eastward Technology Flow: A
Plan of Common Action," Strategic Review , Spring 1984, p.
32.
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IX. THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST TRADE
A. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the declaration of
martial law in Poland and the more recent chilling of U.S.-
Soviet relations, be it for the arrest of Mr. Danilov, the
recent run on U.S. citizens caught spying for the Soviets,
or just general disagreements on human right's issues, has
caused a general reassessment of East-West trade and tech-
nology transfer. Western governments now seem more aware of
the security issues at stake associated with a liberal trade
policy than they did during the height of detente.
The future course of East-West trade and technology
transfer is a difficult item to predict in the international
environment. The economic climate will depend largely on
the political climate generated in the Kremlin and White
House during the next few years. Western leaders may
possibly continue to try and link East-West commercial coop-
eration with items such as Soviet "good faith" in strategic
arms negotiations or disengagement in various Third World
countries. However, even if we saw a normalization of U.S.-
Soviet relations in the near future, it would be unlikely
that there would be a return to the climate of cooperation
experienced during the era of detente.
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B. INFLUENCING FACTORS
The factors that caused the warmth of detente were
several unique and well-timed events that would be difficult
to duplicate in their entirety. There was a special blend
of leadership in both camps that had the right chemistry to
allow detente to thrive. There were economic considerations
on both sides that sought to limit the costly arms race
since strategic parity had been achieved. The Soviets were
anxious to stimulate their sluggish economy with a strong
dose of Western technology. To achieve these goals required
enhancing East-West cooperation.
Compounding these factors was the energy crisis. The
Soviet Union represented a major potential source of oil and
gas for the West, especially Western Europe which has been
hurting for a new energy source since the OPEC embargo. The
result of Western banks 1 willingness to extend credit to the
Soviet bloc and a special mix of domestic and international
political, economic, financial, and strategic factors
resulted in a strong surge in East-West trade during the
1970's.
While predicting the future of East-West trade with any
assurance of even "ball-park" accuracy is impossible, it is
of value to economists, government officials and commercial
interests to be aware of the factors which are likely to
promote or retard East-West technology flows during the next
several years.
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C. THE THIRD WORLD WAR! CALL IT PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
In reporting my research on East-West trade, I would be
remiss if I did not add my own bottom line. If one is look-
ing for a bottom line in this study, I apologize for hiding
it here at the end. As I have already eluded to, the future
of East-West trade is impossible to predict—but, one thing
is certain in East-West trade; that is, in order to have
successful trade both parties must be willing participants.
Given the vast ideological differences between the East and
West, one must certainly expect the necessity of the two
systems to first reenter into an era of detente to fully
"enjoy" the fruits of East-West trade. Hopefully this
aspect of international relations will not reoccur. Let us
remember that communism is the enemy; "to coexist with
communism on the same planet is impossible. Either it will
spread, cancer-like, to destroy mankind, or else mankind
will have to rid itself of communism (and even then face
lengthy treatment for secondary tumors)." 66 Aleksandr I.
Solzhenitsyn suggests that the Soviet leaders would indeed
be quite eager and prepared to carry on detente; "why
shouldn't they?" he asks.
Detente will continue to stand Soviet communism in very
good stead: for the purpose of stifling the last flicker
of dissidence in the Soviet Union and buying up whatever
electronic equipment is necessary. . . . Communism will
66Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Mortal Danger: How
Misperceptions about Russia Imperil America , 2d ed. , Harper
& Row, New York, New York, 1981, p. 1.
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never be halted by negotiations or through the machina-
tions of detente. "° 7
To continue to trade with the East which, in effect, will
benefit the "enemy," we extend what Solzhenitsyn describes
as
a real war that has been going on for thirty-five years in
which there has been a long string of Western retreats and
the loss of more than twenty countries, and yet the West




Solzhenitsyn goes on to suggest that the West continues to
pin its hopes on a spurious "detente," which for the Soviets
is the most convenient form of protracted warfare, and the
one most likely to end in victory. The Soviet leaders would
certainly prefer to achieve their international objectives
by means of "detente," terrorism and coups d'etat: why
should they desire a global war, especially a nuclear one?
D. CONCLUSION
The whole structure and foundation of Communist power,
which today threatens the world, would have been impossible
without the equipment and technical assistance and direct
Western economic aid to the Soviet bloc that was given in
the post-World War II years on up to today.
Let us hope that some future historian will not have to
write that, by continuing to share the means of economic
power with the Soviets without troubling to pose certain
67Solzhenitsyn, The Mortal Danger: How Misperceptions
about Russia Imperil America , p. 37.
68Solzhenitsyn, The Mortal Danger: How Misperceptions
about Russia Imperil America , p. 124.
98
elementary political conditions, the great Western nations
made themselves the instruments of their own
destruction. 69
The answer to the question "what of the future of East-
West trade?" will remain a volatile subject; the situation
that the West finds itself in will require bold decisions by-
outstanding leaders and a rejection of routine thinking.
69Thomas J. Dodd, Senator, Introduction to the sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary Report, "The
Many Crises of the Soviet Economy," June 2, 1964.
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X. CONCLUSIONS
The United States and its allies have a challenge to
maintain a military capability sufficient to convince the
Soviets that the costs of aggression far outweigh any
possible gain. Together we must be firm in our resolve to
support and defend, when necessary, the security of all free
nations. Thus far, it appears that our strategy of nuclear
and conventional deterrence has been effective in preventing
major war. We should keep in mind, however, that as each
day passes a stagnant deterrence strategy without improved
technologies allows other factors such as political and
economic issues to have more weight in the strategic balance
equation, an equation that if allowed to go unchecked in
today's world could in effect destroy the world as we now
know it. It is therefore important that the West not allow
its strategy of deterrence to stagnate or suffer due to
technology transfer to the East which would in turn upset
the balance of strategic options to the West. It is incum-
bent upon the United States and its allies to have a full
and precise understanding of the Soviet challenge as we take
the steps necessary to preserve our freedom, to ensure an
effective deterrent to the threat and use of force, and, at
the same time, to seek genuine and equitable arms reduc-
tions. The environment that this somewhat optimistic goal,
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given recent history (the past 200 years) , would develop, is
clouded with issues of differing political and economic
issues— free trade vs. export controls to monitor the flow
of military technology that could be used against us by our
enemies in time of war. And again the issue that anything
we do to aid the East will, in effect, have a negative
impact on us, even if some benefits occur as well. To
attempt to provide an all-encompassing economic policy
towards the East in this study would be a futile exercise,
because it could never include all the circumstances and
conflicting pressures facing Western governments. It is
clear, however, that the sale of military equipment to
potential adversaries is not in the U.S. national interest.
In 1980, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) said,
The evidence has accumulated in recent months that our
export system is a shambles. What we haven't sold (the
Soviets) we have given away in educational, governmental,
and commercial technical exchange programs. What we
haven't sold or given away, they have stolen.
The thought I want to leave the reader with is not that
I advocate the cessation of U.S. economic contracts with the
Soviet Union. There are a lot of commercial applications of
East-West trade that do not detract from our national
security or that of our allies, and to terminate all commer-
cial interaction with the East would serve no purpose. But
there does seem to be room for vast improvements in our
efforts to insure that our export policies governing
101
technology transfer to the East is better suited to
supporting our national strategy and protecting the national
interest.
We should refrain from using "economic diplomacy," that
is, offering technology transfers to the Soviet Union as an
incentive to moderate its behavior and deny it as a punish-
ment for hostile acts. "Economic diplomacy" is no substi-
tute for a well thought out deterrence policy, and common
sense should dictate that anything the Soviets might want
bad enough to forego opportunities for expansion is probably
something they should not have in the first place. 70
The West must join together to prevent the flow of vital
military technology to the East. The U.S. acting alone
could not prevent such diversions of technology and
equipment as we no longer have a monopoly on technology in
the West. The cooperation of our partners in COCOM is
therefore of greater importance more now than ever. And it
is clear that in order for the U.S. to continue to enjoy
this cooper-ation of its allies in denying strategic
technology to the Soviet Union, we must set an example of
trade restraint in the sensitive areas. In fact, the
relaxation of U.S. con-trols during the 1970' s is a major
reason for the diminish-ing effectiveness of COCOM, 71
70 Carl Gerishman, "Our Technology to Russia for
Profit," Business and Society Review , Winter 1979-1980, p. 35.
71Gerishman, "Our Technology to Russia for Profit," p.
35.
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something that the Reagan Administration has sought to
correct, but a true all-out effort has yet to be seen and is
in my opinion one of the first orders of business that
deserves the West's immediate attention.
Capitalism is indeed more efficient than Communism, but
if this very efficiency is used to sustain and fortify the
enemies of free society, does this not, in the words of
Seymour Martin Lipset, constitute "the ultimate failure of
capitalism?" As was agreed to at the Williamsburg Summit,
"East-West economic relations should be compatible with our
security interests." In the end, the United States will
gain more by seeking a new allied consensus than by pursuing
unilateral, hit-or-miss restrictions. As matters now stand,
allied disarray over East-West trade will do real damage to
Western security by undermining the alliance itself. 72
72Ellen C. Frost and Angela E. Stent, "NATO's Troubles
With East-West Trade," International Security , Summer 1983,
Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 200.
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